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Abstract: Humans are social creatures that interact in a number of different and at least partially
independent social settings, such as work, home, social and political organisations, and church. In
each setting one has an identity, or set of identities, which one is called upon to achieve. To obtain
and maintain an identity one must dedicate scarce resources. The benefits of expending these
resources may be, among other things, income; wealth; success; prestige; power; security; respect;
social acceptance; spiritual fulfillment; and salvation. To better understand how the individual
makes his resource allocation decisions given the many possible interactions, both positive and
negative, across his identities, changes in collective beliefs defining identity, and the
substitutability or complementarity of identities, we develop a simple behavioural model of an
individual whose personal identity is an amalgam of two identities. We interpret the model in the
context of an individual with a secular and a religious identity. 
I INTRODUCTION
Humans are social creatures, and, as such, interact in a number ofdifferent and at least partially independent social settings, such as work,
home, and social, political or religious organisations. In each of these settings
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one has an identity, or set of identities whose actualisations require that one
must put forth effort, that is dedicate scarce resources, be they of time or
money, and use up psychological, spiritual, and human capital to increase the
intensity of that effort. The benefits of expending these resources, of making
these allocational choices (Sen, 2006), may be, among other things, income;
wealth; success; prestige; power; security; respect; social acceptance; spiritual
fulfillment; and salvation. 
Since individuals have plural identities, the effort put forth concerning one
identity may spill over positively or negatively onto the attainment of other
identities. For example, the effort required to be successful in one’s job may
negatively affect one’s family life, or the effort required to gain familial
stability and security may positively affect one’s social identity. Identities may
also be complementary or substitutable. Thus, if complementary, something
which makes one identity more easily obtainable, such as an improvement in
childcare provision that lessens the effort required to raise one’s children,
frees resources that can be dedicated to attaining a complementary identity,
such as one’s work identity.  However, if substitutable, something which
makes one identity more easily obtainable may divert resources into that
identity, work in the childcare example, perhaps leading to that identity
dominating or displacing all others, such as parenting. 
The identities to which one aspires are ideals,1 where the ideal, as
perceived by the individual, is defined by collective beliefs.2 That is, what
constitutes the ideal is based on one’s beliefs about what the majority of
members of one’s reference group for that identity believe. Thus, this ideal
could be inconsistent with one’s own personal ideal and these ideals can
change over time. However, to the extent that one’s identities are social
identities, it is what one believes the reference group believes that is
determinant. 
To put the components together, consider the following example. Suppose
you wish to be successful in your new job. To succeed you believe that a
majority of your co-workers and your boss believe that above and beyond doing
your job well you must also be well liked by your co-workers and socialise with
them on a regular basis, such as by spending Friday evenings with them at the
pub. This belief about group beliefs about ideal behaviour could be reached by
observing your boss and your co-workers, who come to their beliefs about ideal
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1 The use of the term ideal may be a bit misleading since “ideal behaviour” may be consistent with
a negative stereotype, such as those of lower castes are less capable (Hoff and Pandey, 2006) or
that blacks are inferior to whites (Loury, 2002). 
2 As discussed below, we borrow the notion of collective beliefs from Orléan (2004); however, in our
context the focus is on individual allocation problems in light of these beliefs.
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behaviour in the same manner. Although you personally believe that the road
to success should be based solely on your job performance and independent of
extracurricular activities, you do your best to be convivial both on and off the
job. Your co-workers do likewise irrespective of their individually held beliefs.
But, should your religious identity require you to fast on Fridays, observe the
Sabbath beginning at sundown, or attend services at the Mosque, or your
family identity requires that you be home with your children or that you visit
an aged parent, the effort you put forth to attain your work identity will
negatively affect your ability to achieve your religious and family identities. 
To better understand how the individual makes his resource allocation
decisions given the many possible interactions, both positive and negative,
across his chosen identities, changes in collective beliefs, and the substitut-
ability or complementarity of identities, we develop a simple behavioural
model of an individual whose personal identity is an amalgam of N identities.
Specifically, we model how individuals allocate resources among identities and
how these resource allocation decisions are affected by changes, actual or
perceived, in the individuals’ social and economic environments. 
II LITERATURE REVIEW
The standard representation of an individual in economics is via a single
preference ordering, a single identity that is fixed through time and not
subject to individual choice. Individuals pursue their own self-interest, one
that can be broadened out to have a social dimension, but the self, and
satisfaction of that self, remains central to the analysis. Sen (1977) has
challenged this as being too simplistic on a number of fronts. First, he argues
(Sen 1985; 2002) that individual decision making cannot be characterised by
optimising one’s self-interest. Individuals have goals and make choices that
are inconsistent with self-interest or personal gain no matter how broadly or
narrowly defined. Rather, individuals are committed to particular social
behaviours either to obtain a goal, such as social justice, which may bring
them to harm in the hope of benefiting society, or to maintain the social
structure within which they live by holding to societal behavioural norms (Sen
1997). Second, individuals do not have a single preference ordering but, rather,
have multiple preference orderings, which could be interpreted as multiple
identities, over a given set of choices. The individual then must have a
preference ordering over the multiple orderings, but this ordering may not be
complete. This incomplete ordering can lead to individuals exhibiting time
inconsistent behaviours, as which ordering takes precedence at a moment in
time may depend on any number of exogenous or endogenous factors. 
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Akerlof and Kranton (2000; 2005) introduced the concept of identity and
preferences based on achieving an assigned social identity rather than simply
maximising one’s narrow self-interest to mainstream economic discourse.
While they maintain the concept of a single preference ordering and do not
consider selfless, socially committed behaviours, they broaden the analysis to
include the individual’s social setting, how he is placed therein (by assignment
rather than choice), and how he behaves to both be what society expects him
to be and to minimise the cognitive dissonance of defying social expectations.
Their models are closely related to models of socially referenced preferences,
which also assume a single preference ordering and self-interested behaviour,
such as Veblen (1934); Duesenberry (1949); Easterlin (1974); Frank (1985);
and Clark and Oswald (1998); among others. A crucial difference, which may
be more in interpretation than substance, is that in Akerlof and Kranton’s
analyses, individuals try to obtain an ideal identity rather than assessing
their happiness relative to others in their reference group, or a sufficient
statistic representing that reference group, per se. For Akerlof and Kranton,
the closer one gets to the ideal, in terms of behaviour as well as physical
characteristics, thereby decreasing cognitive dissonance, the greater the
identity-linked benefits. A substantive difference is that reference groups may
be a matter of choice. Identities for Akerlof and Kranton’s agents are, by and
large, not.
Kirman and Teschl (2004; 2006), Teschl (2006) and Horst, Kirman and
Teschl (2006) acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of standard
economic theory and its extensions while taking seriously Sen’s criticisms to
better model identity and choice. Specifically, they agree that the standard
representation of an economic agent is in terms of a given preference ordering.
These preferences are fixed over time and, together with the specific
constraints the agent faces, the agent attempts to maximise his utility. This
gives a simple picture of the agent’s identity at each moment in time by
describing what the agent is. Introducing preferences for one’s social identity
expands rather than changes this simple view of a global and unchanging
preference ordering, by adding to the description of the economic agent’s
identity more information as to where the agent is situated within a social
space. To allow an individual to change, people choose to belong to social
groups, rather than being assigned thereto, in order to become who they want
to be and to realise their, not necessarily fixed, self-image. By choosing their
social groups, people are consciously changing what and where they are right
now, thus changing their preference ordering, to become who they would like
to be in the future. The social group is a mechanism for people to acquire those
characteristics they would like to have. However, people will not necessarily
remain tied to their choices of social groups because these groups may
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themselves change over time. Ultimately, of course, who they want to be might
also change as a consequence of their search for identity. But, this conscious
and continuous change leads to incomplete preference orderings, and thus
what will appear to be time inconsistent choices, thereby ruling out standard
analysis.
Kirman and his colleagues model how an individual defines himself by
choosing to change through time. That individual remains identifiable as a
unique individual across change, as required by Davis’s (2006) conception of
the individual. This is in contrast to Parfitt (1971) who characterises the
individual as a sequence of selves. Bazin and Ballet (2006) characterise the
individual as having multiple selves simultaneously, like multiple identities.
Their model also suggests that the individual’s preference ordering will not be
complete. Similar in emphasis are Schelling’s (1985) analysis of multiple
selves and Loewenstein’s (2000) recognition of our inability to resist visceral
urges. Both Schelling and Loewenstein suggest these visceral factors cause us
to behave in a manner inconsistent with our true (or dominant) preferences,
while only Schelling contends that individuals have multiple selves, each with
his own preference ordering. Loewenstein, in contrast, contends that decisions
are made by a single self with a single preference ordering, but effects of
(visceral) states cause our lower order or primitive (irrational) nature to
overwhelm our higher order (rational) nature when decisions are made under
their influence. 
In our model, individuals have a single self which is comprised of multiple
social identities.  In this way it bears some relationship to Hollander’s (1990)
model of social exchange and the Brekke et al. (2003) model of moral
motivation. These papers ask why individuals take actions that are socially, if
not what is thought to be individually, optimal. Hollander suggests it is
because we seek the approval of our fellows. Brekke et al., suggest that it is
because we, as individuals, want to maintain our self-image as socially
responsible individuals, and define the socially responsible ideal via Kant’s
Categorical Imperative. Behaving to earn the approval of our fellows or to
establish our self-image as socially responsible individuals may be consistent
with collective beliefs about or social norms of ideal behaviour, that is, ideal
identities. Here, however, we follow Orléan (2004), who provides a generic
definition of collective beliefs.  He defines a collective belief from the
perspective of an individual such that “an individual i believes that the group
G believes the proposition Q if he believes that, in the majority, the members
of the group believe that the group G believes Q” (p. 200). In our model the
proposition Q is the ideal identity, which will be a function of observable and
unobservable characteristics as well as the individual’s perceptions thereof.
The observable characteristics can be considered Schelling saliences
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(Schelling, 1960), or focal points upon which individuals condition their
actions. 
III THE MODEL
In our model agents’ invest in identities to achieve a desired self-image.
Following standard theory, the individual agent has a single preference
ordering defined over N distinct identities. Some identities may be latent,
requiring no effort to obtain, while others may be dominant. The agent invests
effort in identities to achieve his personal ideal. The individual identities can
be in conflict. That is, building up one identity or reducing the cognitive
dissonance between oneself and one’s chosen identity, may move one further
away from another identity goal thereby increasing the cognitive dissonance
suffered in that identity. The utility maximising agent seeks to balance these
forces. Observed behaviour may suggest social rather than self-interest
optimisation and thus be contrary to self-interest as narrowly defined, as
when achieving an identity consistent with one’s self-image leads to personal
discomfort or loss which, herein, would be the desired state as it would be
consistent with the agent’s ideal identity, or appear time inconsistent should
ideals/collective beliefs or the individual’s self-image change. 
Let 
(1)
represent an individual’s utility defined over identities, his preference
ordering over identities which defines his overall or composite identity.
Utility/Identity is a function of his n = 1, …, N identity relative to its ideal, 
in – in* , for all n. Assume Un(…, in – in*,…) > 0 (<0) for in – in* < 0 (>0), for all
n = 1,…,N and that Unn  0 for all n = 1,…,N. The sign of Unm n  m is
positive if his n and m identities are complements, negative if they are
substitutes, and zero if they are independent.
Assume that one’s identities and the effort (resources expended) required
to attain them are related as follows 
(2)
where (3)
where ên is the effort the individual puts into his n identity, which is the sum
eˆ e en n mn m
m n
= +
≠
∑β
i i e en n n n n− = −* *ˆ ( )ν
U i i i iN N( ,..., )* *1 1− −
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of his effort dedicated to his n identity, en, and any spillover from effort
dedicated to his other identities, βmnem, for all m, where βmn < 1. en*(νn)
represents the individual’s belief of the collective belief (Orléan, 2004) of the
effort required to attain the ideal, where νn is a vector of conditioning variables
(focal points, or Schelling salience (1960)) upon which beliefs about identity n
are conditioned. The perception of these conditioning variables and the
collective beliefs implied can depend on context. In addition it is possible that
perceived spillover effects can be augmented or diminished by collective
beliefs. Thus, in general, βnm could be a function of νn.
Substituting Equations (2) and (3) into the individual’s utility function (1),
the individual’s task is to allocate his resources, 
(4)
optimally. We make the simplifying assumption that total effort available is
fixed, but the model could be generalised to include effort intensity. 
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1), the agent optimises 
(5)
subject to his resource and non-negativity constraints (4). The first-order
conditions of the agent’s problem are
, n = 1,…, N (6)
where λ is the marginal disutility of effort, and μn is the multiplier on the 
non-negativity constraint. μn 0 if the optimal choice of en 0: all effort is put
into the individual’s other identities since the marginal disutility of effort
exceeds the marginal utility of effort invested in that identity either directly
or indirectly. Not all identities are mutually compatible. 
To derive easily interpretable results, assume that the agent’s effort is
positive for only two identities, S and R. Let βRS = β and βSR = α, and let 
νS = ν and νR = χ.  By resource constraint (4) this implies
(7)
and an effective utility function of
ˆ ( )
ˆ ( ) (
e e e e e e
e e e e e
S R R R
R R R R
= − + = − −
= + − = −
β β
α α
1
1 )+αe
U Un m
mn
m n
n+ − + =
≠
∑ β λ μ 0
U e e e e e em
m
m N mN
m N
m N1 1
1
1 1+ − + −
≠ ≠
∑ ∑β ν β* *( ),..., (ν N )⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
e en
n
= ∑ en ≥ 0
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(8)
The agent’s optimal choice of eR is defined by 
(9)
where U1 is the marginal utility of effort invested in identity S, and U2 is the
marginal utility of effort invested in identity R. The agent allocates his
resources so that the marginal rate of substitution between identity S and
identity R equals the marginal rate of transformation, which is defined by the
effort spillovers. 
While we analyze the individual’s problem as an optimisation exercise, we
do so to determine in which direction resources will be reallocated as a result
of exogenous changes in an individual’s environment. To explore the
interactions across identities as a result of changes in this environment –
changes in the conditioning variables that cause collective beliefs to change,
and the effects of substitutability or complementarity of identities – we totally
differentiate (9). 
(10)
'
From (10) the following three results are straightforward to derive. Proofs
can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1: If achieving an individual’s R (S) ideal identity becomes
relatively more demanding (eR*(χ) rises for χ constant (eS*(ν) rises for ν
constant)) and if his identities are complementary or independent, then he
reallocates resources away from his S (R) identity to his R (S) identity. If
identities are substitutes, the individual may invest more resources in the
relatively less demanding S (R) identity. 
− − + − =( ) ( )1 1 01 2β αU U
U e e e e e eR S R R( ( ) ( ), ( ) ( )).* *− − − − + −1 1β ν α α χ
46 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
[( ) ( )( ) ( ) ]
[
1 1 1 12 11 12
2
22
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−
β β α αU U U de
I
R
+ − − − + − − + −( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( )1 1 1 111 21 11β α β β αU e U e d UR R U de
U U e d
S
S
12
11 211 1
1
]
[ ( ) ( ) ] ( )
[(
*
*
+
− − + − ′ +β α ν ν
− − + − − − + −β α α α) ( ) ( ) ( )] [( )U e e U U e e d UR R12 2 22 21 1 2 21
22 21
1
1 1
− − +
− − −
′
( ) ]
[( ) ( ) ] (
*
*
β
α β χ
U de
U U de
R
R ) [( ) (( ) ( ) ( ) ]d U U U dχ β β α α α α+ − + − − − − −1 1 1 111 12 22 e) ( ) ]d− −112 2 e
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Proposition 2: Assume eR*(χ)' < 0 [eS*(ν)' < 0]. If a component of the vector
of conditioning variables, χ (ν), increases, then if identities are complements, an
individual will reallocate effort away from his R (S) identity to his S (R)
identity to obtain the best overall balance. If identities are substitutes, an
individual may reallocate resources from his S (R) to his R (S) identity.
Proposition 3: An increase in β (α), the R to S (S to R) spillover leads an
individual to increase resources dedicated to R (S) effort if identities are
complements, and may lead to a decrease in or a mitigating effect on R (S) effort
if identities are substitutes. 
Since an individual’s resources are limited and since his goal is to attain
the best overall identity possible given this limitation, he must allocate his
resources taking into account complementaries across identities,
substitutability across identities, and spillovers of effort, both positive and
negative, across identities. When identities are complementary individuals try
to achieve a balance between them. So, if one becomes more difficult to
achieve, directly or via a change in conditioning variables, the agent will
reallocate resources away from the relatively easily attained identity to the
relatively more difficultly attained identity to maintain a balance. But, if
identities are strong substitutes the individual may find it best to concentrate
on the relatively more easily achieved identity, thereby reducing the resources
dedicated to the identity which is now more difficult to achieve. The degree of
complementarity or substitutability across identities is specific to an
individual. Thus, two agents with the same set of identities could behave very
differently in response to a change in collective beliefs if for one identities are
complements and if for the other identities are strong substitutes. For
example, for some S and R may be complementary, leading them to try to
obtain a S/R balance, while for others they are strong substitutes, leading
them to concentrate either on S or on R, but not both.3 Effort spillover effects,
which essentially weaken or tighten the resource constraint, may intensify or
weaken the complementarity/substitutability effects. Thus, if there are
positive spillovers from S to R and S and R are substitutable identities, one
may still have both even though a predominance of effort goes to achieving
one’s S identity. However, if there are negative spillovers from S to R and S
and R are substitutable identities, the incentive to concentrate all one’s
resources on S is strengthened. Thus, to understand behaviour, it is essential
to determine whether identities are complements or substitutes, the strength
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of their substitutability when they are substitutes and whether effort
spillovers are positive or negative.  
IV INTERPRETATION OF MODEL FOR SECULAR AND 
RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES
For concreteness we will now interpret identity R to be a religious identity
and identity S to be a secular identity and interpret the results of the model
in this light. One’s religious identity could be derived from your membership
in a faith community (which may or may not include your family), while one’s
secular identity could be derived from work, friendships, political and social
group memberships, or residential community. 
Following Proposition 1, assume that achieving an individual’s religious
identity becomes relatively more demanding, for example, as a result of
changes in work rules or times or locations of religious services that make it
more difficult for one to practice one’s religion. Thus, if identities are
complementary, so overall identity is enhanced by putting effort into both, the
individual will reorganise his time so that he can still attend religious services
or pray at the prescribed times, although, perhaps not as often or at all
required times. He will not be able to get as close to either ideal, but will attain
a balance between the two. Thus, many first generation immigrants from
predominantly Muslim to predominantly Christian countries, while not
abandoning their faith, concentrated their effort on becoming materially
successful in their adopted country (Waldman, 2005), remaining Muslim but
practicing at a much reduced level. However, if identities are substitutes, an
individual may find the barriers to religious practice, such as observing the
call to prayer for Muslim teenagers in US public schools (DuLong, 2005), or
openly declaring one’s Christianity and living accordingly for a teenaged
American Evangelical in a highly secularised, permissive environment
(Goodstein, 2006), are so high that he is better off allocating effort in the
secular realm, that is, concentrating resources (both material and psychic) on
his non-religious identity. 
Suppose instead it becomes more difficult for an individual to attain his
secular identity and his identities are substitutes. Then he may choose to
dedicate more of his resources to his religious identity. Consider the situation
of a young graduate in a country with high youth unemployment, such as
France, today. If jobs are scarce and discrimination against young workers or
young workers of specific ethnic backgrounds is rife (even when jobs are
plentiful), then he may find that his overall identity is best achieved by
reallocating resources away from his secular identity to his religious identity.
Thus, “self-identification as a Muslim is in many cases a consequence of an
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ethnic solidarity maintained or preserved by the socio-economic conditions of
segregation. Avoiding the stigma attached to segregation requires dissociation
from the dominant culture to the extent possible, reclaiming the stigmatised
identity, and inverting this stigmatisation into a positive attribute.
Marginalised ethnic or religious groups take both the closeness imposed upon
them by the dominant culture and the binary and essentialist categories with
which the dominant culture characterises them, and turns these dis-
advantages into positive elements of identity” (Cesari, 2005). 
Now, following Proposition 2, consider an increase in one of the
conditioning variables that leads to an increase in the effort required to meet
the ideal religious identity. For example, suppose that there has been a crisis
in the church as a result of perceived failures in church leadership, or that
there were shifts in official doctrine that are found unpalatable by the laity, or
that what had been accepted behavioural norms are no longer so because the
reference group has changed. Clearly, to be a good Catholic, for example, as
defined by what the individual Catholic believes the majority of Catholics
believe to be behaviour befitting a good Catholic, will depend, in part, on the
moral teachings of the church. If the behaviour of members of the church
hierarchy contradicts these moral teachings, then the collective belief of ideal
behaviour can change since the conditioning variable, the focal point, has
changed. Or the collective belief can remain constant, since members of the
church can see beyond the failings of their current leaders. In either case, the
effort required to achieve the ideal would increase. The response would be to
redouble one’s effort, when identities are complements, or to leave the church
or limit practice by reducing both time and money dedicated, if identities are
substitutes. Osoba (2004) shows that charitable contributions to the Catholic
Church and its related charities fell as a result of the paedophilia scandals in
the United States. Lothian (2000) attributes the reduction in Mass attendance
in the United States, Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands to the Vatican II
liturgical reforms, while Fuller (2002) finds the drift away from the Catholic
Church in Ireland a result, in part, of Ireland’s greater integration in Europe
and participation in the world economy. 
Focal points defining identity can shift as a result of political, economic, or
social change. For example, Crouch (2000) traces the role of religion in
European politics following the Second World War in Europe. In the
immediate post-war period there was a significant political shift towards a
Christian Democratic governing philosophy based on a rejection of both
liberalism and socialism. Further, in recognition of the harm animosities
based on religious and ethnic differences had caused, churches came together
to stress the similarities of their beliefs. Christians reached out to each other
and to tolerant non-believers to ensure the continued existence of stable
democracies not riven by sectarian difference. A distinct religious identity
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defined in part by, for example, being Catholic and not being Lutheran, once
perceived as an asset, was now perceived as a liability. What was instead
important was to be a good citizen, where good was defined by commonly held
religious (Judeo-Christian) values. That is, a focal point determining collective
beliefs shifted. This led to a reduction in the effort required to attain one’s
religious ideal and less distinction between religious and secular identities.
The enhanced similarity of identities leads to an increase in resources
dedicated to achieving the secular ideal while resources dedicated to religious
practice and, thereby, the church, dwindle since in achieving one the other is
achieved. In contrast, the religious focal point can remain fixed while the
secular focal point loses definition. Munshi and Wilson (2007) show that in
small communities in the Midwest of the United States jobs were often
obtained via ethnic networks – secular focal points. These networks were often
associated with a migrant church which provided the religious focal point of
people’s lives. While the ethnic networks no longer exist as mechanisms of job
provision and the link between church and ethnic origins has dissipated, the
church remains a focal point of community life. Investments in the life of the
church generate both religious and secular identity again via a blurring of
identity definitions.
Spillover effects across identities can also fundamentally affect behaviour.
Consider first positive spillovers, so that one’s effort in the religious sphere
has a positive spillover onto one’s secular effort, and vice versa. Gruber (2005)
finds that religious practice is good for you both socially and economically. This
is consistent with Weber’s (1950) Protestant work ethic which suggested that
hard work and thrift led both to temporal and eschatological rewards. But,
should the spillover effects be negative, say an increase in religious effort
offsetting secular effort, the individual may choose to forego all religious effort.
This could be the case if practicing one’s religion leads to (partial) social
ostracism which one must work to overcome. Alba (2005) finds evidence of this
in relation both to Catholic immigrants to the United States in the first half of
the twentieth century as well as Muslim immigrants to Europe today. In both
cases some immigrants found that to get ahead materially they had to reject
their traditional religious identities, a task made more or less difficult by
ethnic characteristics which others use to impose or infer identity.
V CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a model in which agents have a single preference
ordering defined over identities. To achieve desired identities individuals
engage in behaviours, take actions that draw on their personal resources, be
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they of time, money, or psychic energy. Identities are defined by collective
beliefs, and may, although they need not, place the good of society over the
good of the individual. The identities an individual strives to obtain may be
complementary, substitutable, or independent of each other, and behaviours
engaged in may be beneficial or detrimental to other identities. Perhaps
paradoxically, although attaining one’s desired identity brings the individual
happiness, utility, it can also bring personal discomfort or material loss. If this
is the case, psychic gains, which are difficult to observe or measure,
overwhelm the material or physical losses. Clearly, behaviours more
consistent with what is usually recognised as the maximisation of self-interest
which generate physical comfort and material gain are also possible, and can
coexist with more selfless behaviours by the same individual.
In modern society individuals are amalgams of many, often conflicting,
identities. Social policies designed to create a cohesive, multicultural society
in which, for example, secular and religious spheres coexist in a positive
synergistic relationship, can lead to unintended consequences if
complementarities, substitutability, and spillover across identities are not
taken into account. Specifically, policies must recognise that while for some
secular and religious identities may be complements, for others they are
substitutes. Why they are one or the other may depend on political, social,
ethnic or economic structures in the society. Thus, policies designed to induce
assimilation, such as requiring immigrants to learn to be Danish or Dutch and
to accept Danish or Dutch social and cultural beliefs (which may be contrary
to one’s religious beliefs) or requiring one to abandon one’s traditional
(religiously mandated) dress (head-scarves, turbans), are based on the,
implicit, assumption that secular and religious identities are complements.
However, if instead these identities are substitutes, such policies may actually
lead not to assimilation but rather to alienation from the dominant culture as
immigrants substitute away from the now more costly secular identity to their
religious identity. The different and ever shifting identities of the individuals
who make up society is a difficult construct upon which to base policy, but it
may be necessary to do just that.
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APPENDIX
The following derivations hold at an interior optimum. 
Let .
if identities complements or independent, < or > 0 if substitutes.
if identities complements or independent, < or > 0 if substitutes.
if identities complements or independent, < or > 0 is substitutes.
if identities complements or independent, < or > 0 if substitutes.
if eR*' < 0, identities complements or independent, < or > 0 if substitutes.
if eS*' < 0, identities complements or independent, < or > 0 if substitutes.
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